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share holder concentration and the regulated companies pay relatively larger dividends. 
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The Ownership and Industry Effects of  
Corporate Dividend Policy in India, 1961-2007 
The dividend policy decision is regarded to be complex having implications for 
economy (macro level) and firm (micro level), as well. At the macro level it helps in 
formulating appropriate policies for achieving the national aggregate savings and sectoral 
distribution of those savings keeping in view the priorities of national credit plans as per  
Bhole (1980) and at the firm level, are crucial in taking investment and financial decisions 
according to Aurebach (1982), Mahapatra (1996), and Benito and Young (2001). The 
relationship between type of ownership and nature of industry the firm represents sector 
membership with their capital structures and dividend policies have received considerable 
attention in literature. The type of industry and sector in which a firm operates is likely to 
have a significant effect on its financing and dividend behavior. Harris and Raviv (1991) state 
that firms in a given industry have similar proportions of individual assets and liabilities while 
studies by Bowen et. al., (1982), Bradley et. al., (1984) and Kester (1986) find that specific 
industries have common financial characteristics and are relatively stable over time. 
Richardson et. al., (2002) on the other hand confirm that the industry affiliation is a strong 
determinant of corporate cash holdings, acquisitions, R&D, capital expenditures, leverage, 
dividends and share repurchase policy. 
The prior research on relationship between industry and dividend policies are mostly 
focused on dividend behavior of public limited and non-financial corporations with reference 
to developed capital markets alone. Similar work analyzing variation of dividends across 
industry groups and over time in the emerging market context is rare. Present study is an 
attempt to fill the gap and investigates empirically cross-sectional trends and specific shifts in 
corporate dividend patterns in India over the last four decades. The evidence and plausible 
explanations of changing dividend behavior and their earnings at an aggregate ownership; i.e. 
closely / largely held and regulated firms, and at disaggregate (PLCs across 20 industries) 
level are presented. Specifically it is looked at the extent to which a firm’s observed dividend 
policy is similar to others across ownership types (Public Limited, Private Limited and 
Finance / Investment Companies in India, hereafter referred to as PLCs, PVLCs and FINCs 
respectively). The behaviors of PLCs have been subject to further analysis by classifying 
them into 20 industries to identify possible sources of variations. The focus is on providing 
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extensive cross-sectional description on how Indian corporate sector firms in general have 
appropriated their profits over the period 1960-61 through 2006-2007 periods. Alternatively it 
is examined whether internal funds are a significant source of finance. Also a look is taken at 
the relationship between dividend payments to equity and preference share holders relative to 
earnings across firms. A cross-sectional time-trend analysis is conducted to specifically 
answer the following questions; Does the trend in cash dividend payments differ across 
Public, Private and Investment companies? What are the variations over period of time and 
specifically after the post-reform periods? Which corporate type (industry) has higher payouts 
and earnings? Whether they retain their relative position over time and does the analysis of 
the dividend payment support the pecking order and the dividend smoothening hypothesis?  
This remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data and 
specifies time-trend models. Results and interpretations of the analysis are presented in 
section 2 whereas, section 3 concludes.  
1. Data and Model Specifications 
For purpose of analysis the data from Reserve Bank of India (RBI), emerging from two 
different dataset compilations namely the published data compendium by on the ‘Private 
Corporate Business Sector in India - Selected Financial Statistics from 1950-51 to 1997-98 
(All Industries)’, and published compendium on ‘Selected Financial Statistics on Public 
Limited Companies 1974-75 to 1999-2007 (Selected Industries)’ consisting of industry level 
data respectively. In order to determine the differences in cash dividend and earnings behavior 
of the (PLCs), private limited (PVLCs) and finance companies (FINCs), we use the former 
source consisting data from 1950-51 to 1997-98 and various issues of the RBI bulletins to 
cover data for the balance periods on above three sub-sectors, at an all industry level. The 
average number of firms in sample, along with study year from which they are drawn is 
appended in table 1 (in Appendix). The cash dividend behavior relating PLCs, PVLCs, and 
the FINCs for all firms in dataset and the time period under consideration is forty-three years, 
1961 through 2007 whereas the industry effects relating PLCs are analyzed for all the firms in 
the dataset for twenty-five years, 1976 through 2007. We divide the entire time-period into 
pre-reform period: 1961-1992 and 1976-1992 and the post- reform period 1993-2007 and 
1993-2007 respectively, to capture the effect of policy break on the dividend decisions of 
firms. For the purpose of analysis of trends we consider only cash dividends (total dividends).  
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The variable size of earnings (SZEAR) is defined as total net profit after taxes after 
accounting for preference dividends is used as the earnings measure for equity dividends 
whereas profits after taxes (PAT) is the earnings measure for preference dividends. Both the 
earnings measures represent the profits available for appropriation to the share holders and 
preference holders respectively. Equity dividend payout ratio (EDPOR) and preference 
dividend payout ratio (PDPOR) is therefore given by total equity dividend (EQDIV) and 
preference dividend (PRFDIV) at the end of the year divided by SZEAR and PAT 
respectively. The equity return (EQRET) and preference return (PRFRET) are a function of 
respective dividends by the book value of the respective share capital, where the book value 
of shares includes bonus shares and shares issued for consideration other than cash. 
The descriptive statistical tools are primarily used for analyzing the cross-sectional 
data. Annual sub-period averages across every five year period are computed to depict their 
changing behavior of dividends in the pre/post-reform and the full period. In order to compare 
the sub-group means across the cross section and over time we use non-parametric techniques 
for they do not assume equal variances. The Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) and Levene’s Robust tests 
are calculated to detect normality and homogeneity of variance respectively. S-W test 
hypothesizes that the data are normally distributed, and a low significance value indicate that 
the distribution of the data differs significantly from a normal. The Levene statistic tests 
hypothesis of equality of variance of the dependent variable for groups defined by categorical 
factor variables and is an alternative to the Bartlett test that is less sensitive to departures from 
normality. This tests the null hypothesis of equality of variance of the dependent variable for 
groups defined by categorical factor variables. In order to test whether two independent 
samples (groups) come from the same population, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S statistic) is 
used. The K-S test is based on the maximum absolute difference between the observed 
cumulative distribution functions for both samples. When this difference is significantly large, 
the two distributions are considered to be different. The Kruskal Wallis-H (KW-H) test for 
several independent samples is used to detect the differences in distribution location, is an 
extension of Mann-Whitney U test and a nonparametric alternative to one-way ANOVA. In the 
KW-H test, the scores are ranked without regard to group membership. If the groups do not 
differ, the mean ranks will be similar to each other. The instantaneous growth rate, 
compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) and the linear trend are computed using semi-log 
(log-lin) and Linear trend model respectively for the full time period, pre and post-
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liberalization period are computed. The instantaneous (constant) growth and the CAGR’s is 
given as as follows. 
1 2ln t tY t uβ β= + +    ...…………………………….……………………..………………...…(1) 
From equation 1 where the X variable is time, we compute the constant percentage over 
the full period, (100. β2) rate of growth (if β2 > 0) or rate of decay (if β2 < 0) in the variable Y 
and the CAGR, over time is computed as 
 = (ln β2 – 1) . 1     …………………………...……………………………..……………...…(2) 
To test for structural stability of regression model break due liberalization, we use 
simplest form of dummies to distinguish the pre-reform (pre-1992) and the post-reform (post 
1993) period. This equation using the dummy variable approach unlike the Chow test 
pinpoints the source(s) of difference the intercept or the slope, or both in the two periods as 
under. 
1 2 1 2ln ( )i i i i i iY D X D X uα α β β= + + + +     ………………………………………..………...…(3) 
Where  Xi and Yi  records time and the independent variable under study respectively. 
D1 equals one for observations in the pre-reform period and zero for observations in the post 
reform period. 2α  is the differential intercept and 2β  is the differential slope coefficient 
indicating how much the slope coefficient of the first period differs from the slope coefficient 
of the second period. The introduction of the dummy variable D in the multiplicative form (D 
multiplied by X) enables to differentiate between slope coefficients of two periods.  
Assuming that ( ) 0,iE u = we obtain 
2 1 21
( 1, ) ( ) ( )i ii iE Y D X Xα α β β= = + + +    …………………………………………..……...…...(4) 
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( 0, )i ii iE Y D X Xα β= = +     …………………………………………………………………..(5) 
which are, respectively, the mean functions for pre-reform and post-reform periods and 
can be used to test the following hypothesis: If the differential intercept coefficient 2α is 
significant, but differential slope coefficient 2β  is statistically insignificant we may at least 
not reject the hypothesis that the two regressions have the same slope (the two regressions 
differ only in the intercepts) that is, two regressions are parallel. If both, the differential 
intercept 2α  and the differential slope coefficient 2β  is statistically significant, indicates that 
the two regressions are completely different, dissimilar. If differential intercept 2α  and 
differential slope coefficient 2β  are insignificant, then both regressions are coincident and if 
the differential intercept coefficient 2α  is statistically insignificant and  2β  is statistically 
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significant, we may accept the hypothesis that the two regressions have the same intercept that 
is the two regressions are concurrent.  
The time trend for the full period and for the pre-reform and the post–reform period 
using dummies are computed using the following linear trend models respectively. 
1 2t tY t uβ β= + +     …………………………………………………………………………...(6) 
1 2 2 2i i iY D t uα α β= + + +  .........................................................................................................(7) 
Where t is variable X representing the time period and Y is the variable under study. Di 
equals 1 to represent the pre-liberalization period whereas equals 0 to represent the post-
liberalization period. Assuming that ( ) 0,iE u =  we obtain the following mean functions for the 
two periods as under 
1 2 1( , 1) ( )i i i iE Y X D Xα α β= = + +   …………………………………………………….….....…(8) 
1 1( , 0)i i i iE Y X D Xα β= = +    ………………………………………………...….…………...…(9) 
2. Results and Interpretations 
The results are presented in two parts, the Ownership and Regulated Industry effects 
and secondly the Inter-and Intra-Industry effects. The former follows first.  
2.1 Ownership and Regulated Industry Effect 
The descriptive statistics across the PLCs, the PVLCs and FINCs relating the dividend 
returns and dividend payout ratio over time are presented in table 2 and 3 respectively. For all 
periods the average equity dividend return with a range of 7-14 % earned by equity holders is 
twice that of preference holders, across all type of companies. However the variability in case 
of preference return is lower in all quinquenniums indicating relatively higher stability 
compared to equity return. Share holders of PLCs gained higher returns in post-reform 
periods compared to the former. Across all type of companies, the equity and the preference 
dividend returns in the post-reform period has declined compared to pre-reform periods. For 
post-reform period the equity return for PLCs increase significantly by 7%. The equity and 
preference return of PLCs followed by that of PVLCs and the highly regulated, FINCs are 
largest across both sub-periods and also in the full period under study. 
The comparative descriptive statistics of dividend payout percentages on similar lines 
presented in table 3 reveal interesting facts. Over other two types of companies, FINCs pay 
relatively a larger proportion of their respective earnings (75 and 6% of SZEAR and PAT 
respectively) to their equity and preference holders in the entire period. This tendency remains 
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unchanged through the pre-reform and post-reform period as well. A positive effect aftermath 
the structural break period is noted in FINCs payout decisions, as they significantly increase 
their equity payout percentage by 145 %, from 55 to 135 % in the preceding sub-period. 
Broadly in sub-period 1993-2007, conservative dividend payout policy is followed by the 
Indian joint stock companies. The PLCs and the PVLCs following a conservative payout 
policy indicate a greater choice of internal financing through retained earnings, thereby 
significantly reducing their equity and preference dividend payouts after reform periods. Such 
conservatism is more pronounced in the PVLCs in relation to PLCs as their equity payout 
percentages decrease by 44 % compared to 20 %. Thus though Indian joint stock companies 
(across closely-held as well as the widely-held firms) demonstrate the tendency of decreasing 
dividends and such pattern is distinct in case of closely-held firms than their widely-held 
counterparts. Specifically, the results suggest retention ratios of public and the private limited 
companies have significantly improved aftermath reforms. Thus it may be safely said that the 
private corporate sector has become adequately self reliant in respect of financing its own 
need after reform periods, suggesting the tenets of the pecking order. Contrary, the regulated 
firms (finance companies) demonstrate a relatively poor corporate savings performance in 
India. 
The results based on table 2 and 3 may hide substantial information, for inter-period 
variations within 1993-2007 periods are not accounted for. The absolute average rupee value 
of earnings available to equity and preference holder using five year data each commencing 
1961 are therefore analyze. Table 4 reports that the SZEAR and PAT increase substantially in 
all quinquenniums. It is also evident that the average rupee values of equity dividend paid by 
the Indian joint stock companies’ increase consistently in each successive quinquenniums, 
and preference dividends widely vary during the 1961-2007 period. Across all the three types 
of companies, the PLCs and the PVLCs  are found to make relatively large and (low) 
aggregate nominal rupee equity dividend payments in full period, whereas on the preference 
front larger absolute values of rupee dividends are paid by the FINCs, both in the post-1991 
and the full period. The impressive average earning by PVLCs by 277% in last three year 
period compared to preceding quinquennium is responsible for the aggregate averages for all 
type of companies to exceed preceding quinquennium averages of total aggregate earnings of 
Indian joint stock companies. But the absolute increase in the total average earnings of all 
types of companies put together don’t translate in form of higher dividend payouts because of 
decrease in equity dividend payout percentage by FINCs by 33% to 133%, from 200% in the 
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last sub-period compared to the preceding. Thus the aggregate equity payout percentage for 
all three types of companies in the last sub-period fall by 12% compared to the preceding 
quinquennium. This decrease in equity payout percent is contrary to the fact that the 
individual average payout ratios of PLCs and PVLCs rise from 39 to 54% and 24 to 44% in 
the sub-period 2001-2007 compared to that of 1996-2007 respectively. Thus it seems that 
there are signs that tendency of decreasing dividends is reversing in case of PLCs and PVLCs 
in recent periods, specifically in post-2007 periods. 
The instantaneous (constant) growth, the compound growth and the linear trend 
through the pre-reform, post-reform, and the full period (1961-2007) are presented in table 5. 
The instantaneous growth rate measures the growth in a given variable at a point in time, 
CAGR over a period of time, whereas the linear trend model measures the sustained absolute 
upward or downward movement in the behavior of a given variable. The annual growth rates 
of the dividend return on shares (equity and preference) register a downward trend across all 
types of companies in the post-reform period. Over the full period, the CAGR of rupee value 
of equity dividend paid by FINCs larger (16%) than that of PLCs and PVLCs (12 and 6%), 
and thus ranks highest in relative ranking in table 6. The CAGR of the rupee value of equity 
dividends paid PVLCs significantly increase from 0.70 percentage points to 35% in the post-
reform period. Adopting the technique of dummy variable using a single regression model 
over the Chow test we test whether the mean parameter of the dividend function has changed 
in the two periods. We find that the differential intercept and the differential slope coefficient 
are both statistically significant and may accept the hypothesis that the regressions for both 
the periods are completely different (Dissimilar). Similarly, preference dividend payment of 
the PVLCs also record a highest annual growth rate of 43% in the post-reform period 
compared to the lowest growth rate it had in the pre-reform period. The growth rates of the 
annual equity and preference dividend payout percentage growth rates appended in table 4 
measured in constant and compounded terms are negative (indicating a rate of decay) in the 
full period across all types of companies owing to the larger negative and statistical 
significant growth coefficients in the pre-reform period. The same dividend payout 
coefficients improve significantly in the post-reform period. FINCs for example, register the 
largest relative CAGR in case of equity and preference dividend payout percentages 
compared to other two types of companies, by recording an impressive 22 and 62% growth 
after the structural break period from the rate of decay with 4 and 10% before the break, 
respectively.  
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The relatively changing ranks across type of companies having highest (lowest) 
dividend payments and dividend return in the same period are comparatively analyzed in table 
6. The relative ranking show that PLCs continue to retain its position as highest dividend 
payer and also yield the highest dividend return on equity and preference share across both 
sub-periods (pre and post-reform period) and the entire period under consideration, but when 
relatively ranked from highest to lowest across type of companies in terms of CAGR of equity 
dividend payments, loose its rank to PVLCs and FINCs in the post-reform and the full period 
respectively. The same table also reports relative ranks based on earnings available to equity 
and preference holders and their dividend payout ratios across types of companies. It is 
observed that the PLCs are relatively more profitable than the PVLCs and FINCs, but FINCs 
continue to have larger average dividend payout percentages (equity and preference) in pre, 
post-reform and the entire period with 78 and 6%, compared to 50 and 3% and 45 and 1.3% 
each for PLCs and PVLCs respectively.  
The results of Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) statistic in table 7 indicate that mostly dividend 
related measures of Indian joint stock companies significantly differ (decrease) in the post-
reform periods compared to its preceding periods as indicated by the above mentioned 
findings. All the results support general understanding that interest alignment between 
different classes of owners influences corporate dividend policy in India. The evidence that 
emerges from above discussion is in tandem with the fact that the dividend payments are 
higher where there are dispersed outsiders with little leverage over the insiders as long as the 
firm is in continuous need of equity capital and thus forces to them to return to the capital 
markets. In general, firms with sizeable “outside” financing such as common equity are 
subject to agency costs of managerial discretion and with no dominating share holders, 
managers have incentives to use cash dividends to convey information about the firms’ future 
performance.  
The incentive to pay cash dividends declines as the shareholder concentration declines 
and supports Agency Cost hypothesis which begun with the work of Donaldson (1961, 1963) 
and Easterbrook (1984), suggesting dividends can help reduce the agency costs associated 
with the separation of ownership and control which occurs in companies. When the ownership 
of the company is highly diversified, individual investors have few incentives to control the 
actions of managers and if they do so, results in high cost for the company. In such a 
framework outsiders may prefer a high dividend policy with a view, better a dividend today 
than a highly uncertain capital gain from questionable future investment. La Porta et. al., 
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(2000) show that a closely held firm does not need to increase its dividend or take on more 
debt to signal to insiders the higher quality of its earnings. In a similar study Yurtoglu (2000) 
describes the main characteristics of ownership structure of the Turkish companies listed on 
the Istanbul stock exchange and show that concentrated ownership and pyramidal structures 
have a negative effect on performance. Kalay and Michaely (2000, 2002) argue that 
asymmetric information and agency considerations are likely to be more severe in public 
rather than private firms. For a privately held firm it would be easier to transmit information 
through other vehicles, and easier to monitor managers, to prevent them from excessive 
spending. Hence the consequences of reducing dividends may be more severe for public firms 
and no difference is expected in case of financial firms. Public firms consequently are 
reluctant to reduce dividends. For China, Lee  and Xiao (2003) find share holding 
concentration is positively associated with cash dividend paying decision, firms with high and 
intermediate share holding concentration have about equal tendency of paying cash dividends, 
but firms with low share holding concentration have much lower tendency of paying cash 
dividends. The results for regulated industry are also in tandem with literature. It is argued 
that the regulated firms give managers the incentive to pay higher dividends to force them to 
raise funds more frequently in the capital market. This is probably since regulated firms are 
more matured than the unregulated firms; managers have no much freedom to make them 
grow as significant difference in percentage of common stock held by insiders. Studies like 
that of Smith (1986) hypothesize that the regulated firms have a restricted growth prospects, 
restricted geography, product market, earnings etc. and the regulators act as delegated 
monitors of firm behavior, reducing considerably the wasteful investments engagements by 
managers or private consumption of the available FCF leading to more dividend distribution. 
Saxena (1999) finds that the mean DPRs for the regulated firms are larger than that of 
unregulated firms as these firms are less risky, have lower growth rates, much few insiders’ 
holdings in its common stock and fewer investment opportunities. Regulation in case of such 
firms effectively reduces the possibility for corporate under-investment simply by transferring 
much of management’s discretion over investment’s decision to regulatory authorities. 
Similarly, Barclay et. al,. (1995) notes that the regulated industries have higher leverage ratios 
and pay higher dividends than unregulated corporations whereas, Collins et. al., (1996) also 
find that the payout ratios for the financial firms and utilities are significantly larger than that 
for unregulated sample firms. 
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2.2 Inter and Intra-Industry Effects 
The annual sub-period averages of amount of nominal rupee dividend distributed and 
dividend percentage return on the book value of shares (both equity and preference) across 20 
industries over 1976 through 2007 period are appended in table 8. Across the industry cross-
section, annual averages of nominal rupee value of dividend are calculated for every five year 
period commencing 1976. The total rupee of average equity and preference dividends in first 
sub-period (1976-1980) is the lowest, pick up successively to record highest payments in last 
quinquenniums (1996-2007) amounting to Rs.2,97,729.79 and Rs.7066.77 lakh, but 
quinquenniums 1991-1995 and 1996-2007 register a higher growth compared to other sub-
periods respectively. This evidence give a clear impression that the in absolute terms, the 
dividend payments effected by select industries mark a significant rise in recent years. The 
behavior of equity and preference return however, is contrary to the pattern we notice above. 
The total average value of the equity and preference return is at its  highest during the period 
1981-85, at 19.20 and 8.34% and decreases to 16.39 and 6.59% till the last (1996-2007) 
quinquenniums respectively.  
The annual sub-period averages of the amount of nominal rupee earnings available for 
repatriation as dividends and dividend payout percentages for 1976 through 2007 period are 
appended in table 9. The average nominal rupee earning measures of the select 20 industries 
available to equity holders and preference holders (SZEAR and PAT) consistently increase 
from the first quinquennium (1991-1995) to their highest levels in 1996-2007, and higher 
growth in the level of earnings is witnessed in sub-period 1991-95. Except for Jute, and 
Foundries, all industries record a massive spurt in their relative earnings over the time 
variable. The Jute industry faces the problem of increasing un-competitiveness, and SZEAR 
and PAT variable measuring earnings attributable to the equity and preference holders carry a 
negative sign through all quinquenniums. The firms affiliated to foundries segment report 
losses in the last quinquennium. Both these industries also remain as lone exceptions 
reporting aggregate losses in the post-reform period compared to former period. The average 
equity dividend payout ratios depict a constantly decreasing tendency over the entire period 
except for the third sub-period, 1986-1990. All firms in the select industries sample have 
significantly higher payouts exceeding 100 percentages in the quinquenniums 1979-80 and 
1986-90 respectively and register a decline up to 46.83% in the last sub-period, 1996-2007. In 
the entire period, Cement and Jute industry record the largest and the lowest dividend payout 
 12
ratio of 296 and 3.86% respectively whereas; the Shipping and the Jute industry have the 
largest (170%) and the lowest (8.45%) payout in the pre and post-reform periods respectively.  
The annual percentage growth rates of dividend, earnings, return and payout 
percentages across industry classification are presented in table 10, whereas appended tables 
11 and 12 summarizes the changing ranks based on absolute values and CAGR of annual 
nominal rupee dividends paid and dividend return on shares. The Basic chemical industry by 
nature pays the highest rupee value of equity and preference dividend in both the pre and 
post-reform and over the entire period 1976-2007, as well. In fact in the sub-period 1995-
2007, this industry pays 17.47 and 15.12% of the total equity and preference dividends, paid 
by all select industries put together. Other capital intensive industries like that of Motor 
vehicles, Machinery, and Fertilizers follow in a decreasing order, larger equity dividend 
payments and  more or less maintain similar ranks in the pre, post-reform and the full period. 
Table 11 and 12 also highlights the significant inter-period differences in the composition in 
the ranks of highest and lowest payers across industry classifications. The traditional 
industries producing consumer goods like Cotton, Tea and Rubber, loose their ranks as the 
second largest, sixth and tenth largest equity dividend payers in the pre-reform period to 
twelfth, eleventh and fifteenth position in the post-reform period respectively whereas, the 
firms affiliated to large sized and capital intensive industries like that of Electricity and 
Foundries significantly improve their relative positions as highest dividend payers, from 
fifteenth and fourteenth highest ranks in the pre-reform period to ninth and eight rank as the 
highest dividend payers in post-reform period respectively. The Fertilizer, Electricity, Silk 
and Cotton industry in the order follow the basic chemical as the largest preference dividend 
payers. In the full period under study, table 12 reveals that industries like that of Construction, 
Rubber and Medicine reporting high compounded annual growth in their respective earnings 
follow low dividend payout ratios whereas those in Jute, and Shipping sector that are lowest 
in the order of growth in their earnings have larger dividend payout ratios indicating dividend 
payments are negative associated with their growth in line with the evidence of Friend and 
Puckett (1964). 
The firms affiliated to industries involved in Production / Distribution of consumer 
goods like that Sugar, Paper and the Trading industries besides Jute and Construction are 
relatively least equity dividend payers. On the preference dividend front, the Tea, Jute, 
Construction, Shipping and Motor industry in an order, relatively pay the lowest. The Basic 
Chemical industry continues to report relatively larger rupee value of earnings attributable to 
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both, equity and preference shareholders in the pre and post reform, and the entire period 
1976-2007 as well. In the sub-period 1995-2007, the Chemical Industry earns an average of 
16.93% of the total average earnings put together by all select industries. This explains the 
tendency to pay larger dividends. Other large and capital-Intensive industries like that of 
Motor vehicles, Fertilizers, Medicines and Other machineries follow the Basic Chemical 
industry in that decreasing order and  more or less maintain similar ranks in the pre, post-
reform and the full period. The size of earnings, as a measure attributable to equity holders of 
the capital intensive industries like Cement and Fertilizers significantly improve their ranks as 
highest relative  earners as the ninth and third largest in the post-reform period  from 
seventeenth and ninth largest earning position in the pre-reform period. Whereas, the 
traditional industries like Foundries and Tea loose their importance as they drop their position 
as thirteenth and fourth largest earners in the pre-reform period to nineteenth and tenth largest 
position in the post- reform period respectively.  
 Significant inter-industry differences in the composition in the ranks with regards to 
highest and lowest payout percentages are evident. It is experienced that the traditional 
industries have higher payouts in the entire period. Firms affiliated to industries like Cotton, 
Cement, Ferrous/non-ferrous metal, Rubber, paper, Silk and Construction in a decreasing 
order top the equity payout percentage list with an average payout range of 82 to 200% in the 
entire period; largely attributable to the high payouts made in the pre-reform periods. 
However, drastic variations in the pre and post-reform period are experienced by the Cement, 
Construction, Paper, Rubber and Silk industries, for they significantly drop their payout 
percentages in the post-reform period inspite of average improvements in their earnings in the 
same period. The Cement industry for instance, enjoying the position as the first largest 
payout industry, relative to all select industries considerably decreases its payout ratio in the 
post-1991 periods to become an industry with 16th largest payout in the post-reform period 
despite improving its earnings from relatively 17th to 9th largest earner position.  
On the other hand industries like Cotton, Metal and Other machinery pay relatively 
larger proportion of their earnings as dividends in the post-reform period, inspite of relative 
fall in their earnings and thus their payouts smooth earnings. Firms belonging to Jute, 
Electricity, Trading, Motor and Medicines in a decreasing order, pay relatively smaller 
portion of their earnings as equity dividends. The behavior of Jute industry can be directly 
correlated with the fragile earnings they report. The Jute industry which stands at the bottom 
end of the earnings list reporting significant increase in losses is also at the bottom end of the 
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list of industries with lowest dividend payout percentages. The dividend payouts of industries 
like basic chemicals, motor, medicines, other machinery and electricity generation / supply 
don’t follow their respective earnings, for they in nature highly capital intensive and have 
higher investment avenues to and growth opportunities, thereby displaying their preference 
towards internally financing their growth requirements.  
In the entire period, the shareholders belonging to Silk and Jute industry earn highest 
and the lowest average dividend return of 45 and 2.42% and 16 and 3.67% on equity and 
preference shares respectively. Drastic variations in the pre and post-reform period with 
regards to dividend return are experienced by share holders of Silk, Tea and Rubber 
industries. The average percentage equity dividend return drops by 46%, from 64 to 17, 
whereas it increases by 20% from 20.75 to 40.77% in case of silk and tea industry. On the 
preference front the shareholders of Silk industry shed its average return by 15% whereas of 
the Rubber industry gain by 11% in the post 1991 in relation to the pre-1991 periods.  
 In post-reform periods compared to the former, the K-W statistics reported in table 13 
indicates that decrease in means of various dividend related variables for the select industries 
under study are sizeable and significant. Overall results imply the changing (decreasing) 
pattern of dividend behaviour across the inter and intra-industry cross-section during the study 
periods. The present study on ownership and industry effects of dividends suggests that the 
aggregate data at corporate sector level provide a useful and interesting perspective on the 
sectoral differences in dividend policies and their relationship with other earning variables, 
but masks many of the industry-specific behavior dominating dividend decisions. To capture 
such effects, we look at the dividend behavior of individual industries in which the firm 
operates. It is found that the dividend policies followed by the regulated industry are 
significantly larger then the un-regulated private and public firms. Further, the dividend 
payments are higher where there are dispersed outsiders and the incentive to pay cash 
dividends therefore declines as the shareholder concentration declines. Dividend policies of 
Indian firms respond to informational asymmetries, agency costs, and the institutional and 
contracting environment it is in. Firms systematically differ across industry class so far as 
their earnings management is concerned. We find that industries with higher reported 
compounded growth in the earnings pay fewer dividends, firms in capital intensive industry 
pay more while those in the production / distribution sector pay fewer dividends. Though 
differences is firm size contributes to the existing variations in nominal dividend and dividend 
related ratio’s across industry-classes, to some extent it is the stage of maturity or more 
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precisely the differences in the corporate type, the industry size, their technology / labour 
orientation, need for cash, fragility of earnings and the general economic trends specific to 
industry-class contributes to the existing variation in dividend policies, but nature of the 
industry seems to dominate largely. The overall evidence also signals that there exists some 
linkage between the product and the capital market.  
 
3. Summary and Findings 
The Indian corporate sector pays relatively more equity dividends then preference 
dividends, and the average equity dividend return earned by equity holders is twice that of 
preference holders. Other things being equal, the probability of paying cash dividends 
decreases with the share holder concentration in India. Across all the three types of 
companies, the widely-held firms pay the largest and the closely-held firms relatively lower 
aggregate nominal rupee equity dividend payments in the pre/post- reform and the full period. 
Private companies (closely held) are characterized by higher shareholding concentration 
compared to public limited companies, and other things being equal the probability of paying 
cash dividends, dividend returns and payout ratio decreases with shareholder concentration.  
Most studies exclude regulated companies intentionally with a notion that their 
regulatory status may affect their dividend policies. We include financial companies as a 
proxy to study regulated industry effect and find that they pay relatively a larger proportion of 
their respective earnings to their equity and preference holders in the entire period. This 
tendency remains unchanged through the pre-reform and the post-reform period, as well and 
is consistent with the limited evidence we review. The absolute average rupee earnings 
available to equity holders and to preference-holders increase commencing 1961-2007 and 
earnings drastically increase in the post 1991 sub-period and this growth and clearly translate 
in higher growth of absolute dividends by private limited companies and finance companies in 
the post-reform and the full period respectively. The dividend policies follow wider patterns 
over time. The average dividend payout ratios for all type of companies decline incase of 
closely held as well as the widely held firms as well but fall is more pronounced in case of 
closely held firms, after the liberalization period indicating a greater choice of internal 
financing through retained earnings.  
  The Chemical Industry in India precedes other industries in terms of nominal rupee 
value of reported size of earnings and dividend payments. Other capital-intensive industries 
like that of Motor vehicles, Machinery, Silk and Fertilizers follow in a decreasing order, 
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larger equity dividend payments and  more or less maintain similar ranks in the pre, post-
reform and the full period. The firms in production/distribution of consumer goods like that of 
jute, sugar construction, paper and the trading industries are relatively bad equity dividend 
payers. In the entire period, the shareholders belonging to silk and (jute industry) earn highest 
and the (lowest) average dividend return on equity and preference shares respectively. 
The dividend payment across/within industry exhibits significant variations over the 
sub-periods. The traditional industries like Cotton, Tea and Rubber pay relatively less 
nominal rupee value of equity dividend in the post-reform period whereas the firms affiliated 
to capital intensive industries like that of Electricity and Foundries significantly improve their 
relative positions as larger dividend payers in the post-reform  period. Drastic variations in the 
pre and post-reform period with regards to dividend return are experienced by share holders 
of silk, tea and rubber industries. Incidentally, the industries making to the top the list of 
highest earners are eventually the largest payers. Large industries like cement and fertilizers 
significantly improve their ranks as highest relative earners in post-reform whereas, 
traditional industries like Foundries and Tea loose their importance as they drop their position 
as largest earners. The evidence in respect of dividend smoothening behavior by industry 
cross-section is mixed. The dividend payouts of industries like Basic Chemicals, Motor, 
Medicines, Other machinery and Electricity generation / supply don’t follow their respective 
earnings, for they in nature highly capital intensive, and have higher investment and growth 
opportunities, thereby displaying their preference towards internally financing their growth 
requirements whereas, Cotton, Metal, and Other machinery pay relatively larger proportion of 
their earnings as dividends in the post-reform period, despite of relative fall in their earnings, 
and thus their payouts smooth earnings. In accordance with Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) 
industries differ with respect to maturity and information opacity, thus the degree of free cash 
flow problems and, consequently as Moh’d et. al., (1995) prove empirically, payout ratios are 
likely to vary considerably across sectors.  
More specifically, on analysis of inter-corporate and inter-industry variations in 
dividend policy for India it is found that dividends interplay differently with exogenous 
factors. It the differences in ownership concentration, external fund requirement based on 
technology, the type of the product they manufacture, the presence of growth opportunities 
via internal financing and the future earnings flows that they expect to generate, differences 
the inter-corporate, inter-industry variations in dividend policies. One important observation 
through the analysis on systematic cross-sectional pattern over a longer period of time is 
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worth re-mentioning. The average dividend payout ratios for all type of companies (closely-
held, widely-held firms, and across industry cross-section) decline and such a tendency is 
more pronounced after the liberalization periods. Though this finding is based on aggregate 
level data the results are captivating and are in tandem with the recent evidence documenting 
dividend payments are disappearing, the world-over.  
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Appendix 
Table 1 Financial Year, Study Year and Number of Indian Joint-Stock Companies by Type of 
Companies, 1961 through 2007 
PLCs PVLCs FINCs Financial Year 
(Yr. ending) Study Year Number Study Year Number Study Year Number 
1960-61 1333 501 1960-61 113 
1961-62 1333 501 176 
1962-63 1333 501 
1962-63 
176 
1963-64 1333 501 194 
1964-65 1333 501 
1964-65 
194 
1965-66 
1965-66 
1333 
1965-66 
501 195 
1966-67 1501 701 
1966-67 
195 
1967-68 1501 701 219 
1968-69 1501 701 
1968-69 
219 
1969-70 
1969-70 
1501 701 220 
1970-71 1650 
1970-71 
701 
1970-71 
220 
1971-72 1650 1001 244 
1972-73 1650 1001 
1972-73 
244 
1973-74 1650 1001 261 
1974-75 1650 1001 
1974-75 
261 
1975-76 
1975-76 
1650 
1975-76 
1001 297 
1976-77 1720 1011 297 
1977-78 1720 1011 
1977-78 
297 
1978-79 1720 1011 1978-79 299 
1979-80 1720 1011 305 
1980-81 
1980-81 
1720 
1980-81 
1011 
1980-81 
305 
1981-82 1651 1004 307 
1982-83 
1982-83 
1651 
1982-83 
1004 
1982-83 
307 
1983-84 1838 1027 325 
1984-85 
1984-85 
1838 
1984-85 
1027 
1984-85 
325 
1985-86 1942 1096 400 
1986-87 
1986-87 
1942 
1986-87 
1096 
1986-87 
400 
1987-88 1885 1019 506 
1988-89 
1988-89 
1885 
1988-89 
1019 
1988-89 
506 
1989-90 2131 1096 411 
1990-91 
1990-91 
2131 
1990-91 
1096 
1990-91 
411 
1991-92 1802 1005 510 
1992-93 
1992-93 
1802 
1992-93 
1005 
1992-93 
510 
1993-94 1720 839 472 
1994-95 
1994-95 
1720 
1994-95 
839 
1994-95 
472 
1995-96 1930 853 705 
1996-97 
1996-97 
1930 
1996-97 
853 
1996-97 
705 
1997-98 1848 890 725 
1998-99 
1998-99 
1848 
1998-99 
890 
1998-99 
725 
1999-00 1927 1126 1024 
2000-01 
2000-01 
1927 
2000-01 
1126 
2000-01 
1024 
2001-02 2031 1338 957 
2002-07 
2002-07 
2031 
2002-07 
1338 
2002-07 
957 
Annual Sub-period Averages 
1961-1992 1662 877 241 
1992-2007 1883 1009 937 
1961-2007 
 
1719 
 
911 
 
434 
Note: PLCs, PVLCs and FINCs refer to Indian Public Limited, Private Limited and Finance/Investment 
companies. Sources: a. Published compendium titled’Private Corporate Business Sector in India - Selected 
Financial Statistics from 1950-51 to 1997-98 (All Industries)’, 2001 and RBI Bulletins (Various Issues), Reserve 
Bank of India, Mumbai. 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics Relating Return and Payout Percentages by Indian Joint Stock 
Companies, Year Ending 1976-2007. 
Equity Dividend Return Preference Dividend Return Statistics PLCs PVLCs FINCs PLCs PVLCs FINCs 
Pre-Reform period ( 1961-1992) 
Mean 12.00 7.38 7.40 7.35 3.74 4.66 
Median 11.52 6.79 7.12 7.09 3.44 4.84 
St. Dev 2.48 2.52 2.21 1.10 1.43 0.90 
Post-Reform period (1993-2007) 
Mean 18.71 7.02 8.88 4.95 2.33 3.60 
Med. 17.72 6.82 6.20 4.46 1.26 3.32 
StDev. 2.39 1.70 4.62 1.72 2.39 1.72 
Full period (1961-2007 ) 
Mean 13.72 7.29 7.78 6.73 3.38 4.36 
Med. 12.60 6.82 7.02 6.93 3.18 4.79 
StDev. 3.83 2.33 3.02 1.65 1.81 1.27 
 Source and Notes: Same as in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics Relating Payout Percentages by Indian Joint Stock Companies, 
Year Ending 1976-2007. 
Equity Dividend Payout Ratio  Preference Dividend Payout Ratio  Statistics PLCs PVLCs FINCs PLCs PVLCs FINCs 
Pre-Reform period ( 1961-1992) 
Mean 53.03 50.41 54.87 3.22 1.66 3.32 
Med. 55.50 46.50 47.49 3.00 1.50 2.79 
StDev. 13.20 42.45 21.89 2.11 1.66 2.26 
Post-Reform period (1993-2007) 
Mean 42.36 28.00 134.97 0.82 0.45 11.41 
Med. 43.00 23.00 49.78 1.00 0.00 3.97 
StDev. 12.43 13.01 222.49 0.75 0.52 18.61 
Full period (1961-2007 ) 
Mean 50.30 44.67 75.36 2.60 1.35 5.66 
Med. 51.00 35.00 49.22 2.00 1.00 3.01 
StDev. 13.70 38.32 115.72 2.13 1.54 10.54 
 Source: Same as in Table 1. 
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Table 4 Annual Sub-period Averages of Nominal Rupee Dividend, Dividend Return, Earnings and Payout Ratios of Indian Joint-
Stock Companies by Type of Companies (Public Limited , Private Limited and Finance Companies), 1961 through 2007 
 
Year 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 2001-07 
Public Limited Companies 
EQDIV 76.77 100.42 143.50 221.49 368.35 787.47 2058.08 4301.20 5748.33 
PRFDIV 7.75 9.36 11.94 13.46 13.57 12.62 9.38 103.80 131.67 
EQRET 11.42 9.66 9.86 11.22 12.63 14.67 19.13 18.67 17.83 
PRFRET 6.66 6.53 6.95 7.47 7.48 8.61 6.74 5.36 3.50 
SZEAR 127.65 162.67 356.99 453.69 820.28 1422.47 6090.72 11496.60 11101.33 
PAT 135.40 171.50 368.93 467.15 833.85 1435.09 6100.10 11600.40 11233.00 
EDPR 60.20 62.60 42.20 52.40 46.00 61.00 36.20 39.40 54.33 
PDPR 5.80 5.80 3.40 3.00 1.60 1.00 0.00 1.20 1.00 
Private Limited Companies 
EQDIV 109.18 82.94 94.46 118.46 107.04 106.86 243.02 476.84 3690.90 
PRFDIV 2.68 2.60 3.30 3.86 4.62 4.26 2.36 10.88 62.60 
EQRET 12.34 7.49 6.47 7.39 5.87 5.15 7.35 6.49 6.91 
PRFRET 5.71 5.06 3.60 3.41 3.28 2.34 1.99 2.91 1.23 
SZEAR 168.02 153.98 242.00 261.16 396.46 402.22 1337.62 2052.10 7733.23 
PAT 170.70 156.58 245.30 265.02 401.08 406.48 1339.98 2062.98 7795.83 
EDPR 64.80 54.20 44.60 53.80 28.40 70.80 17.60 23.80 43.67 
PDPR 1.80 1.60 1.40 1.80 1.20 2.80 0.00 0.40 1.00 
Finance Companies 
EQDIV 26.32 34.32 35.58 46.18 71.86 217.06 1362.74 2743.94 3426.30 
PRFDIV - 3.30 2.98 3.26 4.10 4.54 20.18 244.12 294.00 
EQRET 7.52 7.28 6.53 5.33 6.36 8.71 14.53 8.00 4.38 
PRFRET - 5.09 4.82 4.97 4.66 3.42 3.82 4.91 2.34 
SZEAR 30.38 47.40 57.06 104.92 209.14 659.38 4844.84 4845.58 3794.03 
PAT 30.38 50.70 60.04 108.18 213.24 663.92 4865.02 5089.70 4088.03 
EDPR 88.54 72.61 62.34 44.77 37.84 33.62 28.73 199.80 133.06 
PDPR - 6.58 4.97 3.21 2.15 0.79 0.43 14.13 17.91 
Notes: EQDIV, PRFDIV, EQRET, PRFRET, SZEAR, PAT, EDPR, EDPR, and PDPR refers to Total Rupee value of cash equity dividend, Preference 
dividend, Equity return (dividends by the book value of the respective share capital), Preference return, Size of Earnings (net profit after taxes after 
accounting for preference dividends) as the earnings measure for equity dividend payments, Net profit after taxes as the earnings measure for preference 
dividend payments, Equity dividend payout ratio (dividend by respective measure of earnings) and Preference dividend payout ratio respectively.  
Source:  Same as in Table 1. 
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Table 5 Annual Percentage Growth Rates of Annual Nominal Rupee Dividend Paid & Dividend Return on Shares Equity & 
Preference) of Indian Joint-Stock Companies by Type of Companies, 1961 through 2007 
Instantaneous Linear Trend Annually Compounded Variables 
1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 
Type of 
Regression 
Public Limited Companies 
EQDIV 9.63 10.50 11.72 34.73 392.65 122.41 10.11 11.07 12.43 Coincident 
PRFDIV 1.75 34.71 5.27 0.19 16.83 2.31 1.77 41.50 5.42 Dissimilar 
EQRET 1.51 -1.62 1.81 0.20 -0.31 0.25 1.52 -1.61 1.82 Dissimilar 
PRFRET 0.90 -5.95 -0.88 0.07 -0.30 -0.04 0.91 -5.77 -0.88 Dissimilar 
SZEAR 10.46 4.95 12.58 79.49 345.88 291.14 11.02 5.07 13.40 Parallel 
PAT 10.26 5.11 12.43 79.68 362.71 293.46 10.80 5.24 13.24 Parallel 
EDPR -0.82 5.55 -0.86 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.82 5.70 -0.86 Dissimilar 
PDPR -8.50 29.60 -7.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 -8.15 34.45 -6.90 Dissimilar 
Private Limited Companies 
EQDIV 0.70 30.39 5.57 0.80 436.23 39.49 0.70 35.51 5.73 Dissimilar 
PRFDIV 0.79 43.27 2.98 0.04 7.64 0.66 0.79 54.14 3.02 Dissimilar 
EQRET -2.51 -1.50 -1.13 -0.20 -0.07 -0.10 -2.48 -1.49 -1.13 Coincident 
PRFRET -3.98 -6.15 -3.76 -0.13 -0.10 -0.09 -3.90 -5.97 -3.69 Coincident 
SZEAR 4.16 20.55 8.08 16.90 810.74 104.36 4.25 22.81 8.42 Dissimilar 
PAT 4.17 20.63 8.05 16.94 818.38 105.02 4.26 22.91 8.39 Dissimilar 
EDPR -3.46 9.84 -2.51 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -3.40 10.34 -2.48 Dissimilar 
PDPR -3.38 22.64 -5.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.32 25.41 -4.95 Dissimilar 
Finance Companies 
EQDIV 8.76 8.01 13.62 11.86 199.60 76.47 9.16 8.34 14.59 Coincident 
PRFDIV 3.19 31.02 13.27 0.20 33.01 7.16 3.24 36.38 14.19 Dissimilar 
EQRET 0.85 -15.21 0.33 0.09 -1.28 0.05 0.85 -14.11 0.33 Dissimilar 
PRFRET -1.24 -2.04 -1.63 -0.04 -0.08 -0.05 -1.23 -2.02 -1.62 Coincident 
SZEAR 12.86 -16.94 13.18 41.53 -207.85 138.46 13.72 -15.58 14.08 Dissimilar 
PAT 12.77 -15.95 13.33 41.75 -174.84 144.26 13.62 -14.75 14.26 Dissimilar 
EDPR -4.10 20.07 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -4.01 22.23 -0.07 Dissimilar 
PDPR -11.04 48.11 -0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 -10.45 61.79 -0.62 Dissimilar 
      Notes and Source:  Same as in Table 4. 
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Table 6 Relative Ranks based on Absolute and CAGR of Equity and Preference Dividend 
Measures by Indian Joint Stock Companies, 1976-2007. 
Period 1961-1992 1993-2007 1961-2007 
Type PLC's PVLC's FINC's PLC's PVLC's FINC's PLC's PVLC's FINC's 
                     Absolute Aggregate based Ranks  
EQDIV 1 2 3 1 3 2 1 2 3 
PRFDIV 1 2 3 2 3 1 1 3 2 
EQRET 1 2 3 1 3 2 1 2 3 
PRFRET 1 3 2 1 3 2 1 3 2 
SZEAR 1 2 3 1 3 2 1 2 3 
PAT 1 2 3 1 3 2 1 2 3 
EDPOR 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 
PDPOR 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 
CAGR based Ranks 
EQDIV 1 3 2 2 1 3 2 3 1 
PRFDIV 2 3 1 2 1 3 2 3 1 
EQRET 1 3 2 2 1 3 1 3 2 
PRFRET 1 3 2 2 3 1 1 3 2 
SZEAR 2 3 1 2 1 3 2 3 1 
PAT 2 3 1 2 1 3 2 3 1 
EDPOR 1 2 3 3 2 1 2 3 1 
PDPOR 2 1 3 2 3 1 3 2 1 
Note: 1=Highest, 3=Lowest Rank   Source: Same as in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 7 Results of K-W Test to detect Differences in Dividend Related Measures due to the 
Impact of Economic Reforms across Indian Joint Stock Companies. 
K-W Stats. EQDIV PRFDIV EQRET PRFRET SZEAR PAT EDPR PDPR 
Public Limited Companies 
Chi-Square 24.00 5.47 20.34 12.30 23.73 23.73 5.34 12.89 
Asymp. Sig. 0.00*** 0.02** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.02** 0.00*** 
Private Limited Companies 
Chi-Square 24.00 0.34 0.01 7.90 23.73 23.73 6.14 15.84 
Asymp. Sig. 0.00*** 0.56 0.93 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 
Finance Companies 
Chi-Square 24.00 22.27 0.00 5.00 13.91 14.97 0.75 0.14 
Asymp. Sig. 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.86 0.03** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.39 0.71 
Note and Source: Same as in Table 4. 
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Table 8 Annual Sub-Period Averages of Nominal Dividend Distributed and Dividend Return across Industry  
Cross-section, 1976-2007 
Industry Rupee Value of Equity & Preference Dividend  Equity & Preference Dividend Return Percentages 
Period 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 
3479.80 5315.69 11077.89 27659.84 52002.00 13.58 13.30 15.02 13.80 16.00 Basic Chemical 
263.00 226.84 300.51 190.78 1068.84 11.21 7.19 12.21 5.86 7.27 
700.40 879.75 1536.34 8021.73 9192.27 11.52 10.57 8.74 15.48 13.23 Cement 
34.80 72.05 27.32 63.42 160.77 5.65 12.58 4.43 9.31 7.00 
1047.60 1016.61 3457.27 8002.17 26921.52 14.23 12.25 14.93 13.48 17.53 Fertilizers 
104.40 61.80 187.58 130.71 826.37 13.28 6.01 17.49 7.06 8.33 
117.80 242.44 822.01 1695.07 3909.37 10.10 14.02 12.96 13.41 8.24 Construction 
7.00 39.84 2.08 0.00 17.55 10.05 8.77 2.46 0.00 1.60 
1860.40 3446.72 5718.24 6045.92 8180.32 9.76 13.47 15.76 17.51 11.95 Cotton 
97.20 59.01 113.44 33.88 595.06 5.40 3.39 7.91 3.69 5.07 
394.20 862.55 1359.04 4236.05 16475.06 11.68 14.40 16.35 18.54 21.74 Electricity 
57.20 79.56 56.70 44.27 906.20 8.28 8.03 7.00 3.98 6.97 
1702.60 2970.02 3821.23 9792.17 20509.21 11.35 13.82 11.00 13.24 14.64 Electric Mach. 
80.60 72.85 48.11 60.10 436.13 9.25 8.87 6.84 5.80 3.53 
552.40 922.97 1687.93 3589.43 6272.12 7.19 8.39 10.15 12.66 10.56 Metal 
34.80 45.66 56.13 16.53 165.25 6.43 6.60 9.51 4.06 3.39 
360.40 599.95 1576.97 9836.62 8793.97 6.51 8.31 10.32 16.03 6.78 Foundry 
33.80 23.51 44.75 43.95 316.20 6.24 4.62 8.16 4.66 6.09 
68.00 39.90 45.51 174.02 55.65 3.23 1.77 1.80 4.11 1.19 Jute 
27.60 11.08 6.63 15.17 1.37 4.83 2.30 2.30 8.60 0.33 
1748.40 3281.26 5553.31 12131.52 20496.36 12.06 14.28 14.09 19.72 21.81 Other Machinery 
113.60 86.83 60.17 37.66 50.95 9.04 7.40 7.70 9.22 2.73 
1046.80 1801.10 3380.38 6959.21 24785.50 16.82 14.16 16.59 19.29 37.21 Medicines 
13.00 11.46 9.81 4.75 516.78 5.22 6.18 8.80 1.73 15.13 
1110.00 2715.87 5800.08 13619.77 40898.77 10.34 19.55 19.63 20.43 31.50 Motor 
53.20 132.27 32.23 18.65 78.47 6.08 16.62 5.56 7.54 2.15 
769.60 946.95 1383.31 3129.10 2818.52 10.06 7.61 7.33 16.15 7.60 Paper 
70.40 59.52 45.93 53.24 193.49 6.78 5.75 6.44 15.07 7.32 
500.60 737.56 1990.34 3978.84 4438.74 11.57 10.51 16.63 20.57 15.28 Rubber 
5.60 6.16 88.41 26.24 235.16 5.28 2.85 20.74 9.13 32.06 
Shipping 359.40 325.24 1128.27 4873.81 5956.30 8.00 4.88 8.27 19.40 13.42 
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Continued Table 8 Annual Sub-Period Averages of Nominal Dividend Distributed and Dividend Return across Industry  Cross-
section, 1976-2007 
Industry Rupee Value of Equity & Preference Dividend  Equity & Preference Dividend Return Percentages 
Period 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 
 3.33 8.36 5.50 89.79 191.81 2.10 1.88 1.88 5.94 9.84 
523.60 3800.15 1531.47 6520.99 30533.76 13.30 167.22 10.51 14.03 20.50 Silk 
55.20 51.24 39.35 52.91 895.51 7.92 47.72 10.01 11.50 3.24 
211.80 281.60 735.18 1347.11 2212.52 4.95 6.94 14.59 17.24 11.15 Sugar 
19.40 28.16 27.92 30.88 256.07 3.71 7.32 10.20 10.89 7.39 
720.20 1412.44 4773.41 8217.93 7742.84 15.72 16.09 30.44 44.19 37.34 Tea 
10.40 7.34 9.10 5.11 27.70 7.08 5.96 6.89 8.51 1.81 
451.40 804.41 1160.18 1905.21 5534.99 9.60 13.30 12.69 12.38 10.22 Trading 
25.60 17.50 17.58 5.77 292.34 5.68 3.28 7.20 2.20 3.85 
Source: Published compendium on ‘Selected Financial Statistics on Public Limited Companies 1974-75 to 1999-2007 (Selected Industries)’ and RBI 
Bulletins (Various Issues), Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai. 
 
Table 9 Annual Sub-Period Averages of Rupee Earnings measure; Size of Earnings, Profits after Taxes and Dividend Payout 
Percentage’s across Industry Cross-section, 1976-2007 
Period Size of Earnings & Profits after Taxes Equity & Preference Dividend Payout Ratio 
Industry 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 
9074.20 12708.18 20227.25 76838.10 129418.38 38.23 43.43 63.69 39.17 43.11 Basic Chemical 
9337.20 12935.02 20527.76 77028.88 130487.22 2.74 1.81 1.85 0.31 0.99 
946.40 4479.02 -5724.27 30977.73 19491.87 99.30 155.55 632.31 27.52 30.28 Cement 
981.20 4551.06 -5696.95 31041.16 19620.49 4.77 50.70 8.56 0.26 0.24 
2692.00 4557.61 5074.74 20229.71 86468.62 41.78 25.41 115.51 50.70 31.35 Fertilizers 
2796.40 4607.05 5262.32 20360.42 87294.99 4.47 1.11 4.62 1.01 0.99 
285.00 1081.54 1324.17 5258.89 17109.63 82.88 24.04 238.40 37.45 24.66 Construction 
290.60 1121.38 1325.42 5258.89 17116.65 6.07 2.64 0.92 0.00 0.05 
2191.20 2996.03 1751.85 18871.21 4411.71 218.90 232.77 349.13 123.42 91.87 Cotton 
2288.40 3055.03 1865.29 18905.10 5006.77 25.95 4.28 6.46 0.27 4.97 
1119.00 4061.71 7457.26 18551.79 54878.13 35.60 25.06 19.33 21.55 31.78 Electricity 
1176.20 4141.27 7513.96 18578.35 55784.33 4.86 2.82 0.85 0.20 1.50 
3405.20 7005.60 5567.69 24988.36 53731.96 53.45 45.24 71.32 49.20 39.93 Electric Mach. 
3485.80 7078.45 5615.80 25048.46 54168.09 2.78 1.06 0.92 0.46 0.93 
798.20 1324.83 3729.79 7447.85 7334.47 534.52 63.99 51.45 58.27 119.69 Metal 
833.00 1370.50 3785.92 7464.38 7499.71 82.37 3.03 2.19 0.35 8.84 
 247 
Continued Table 9 Annual Sub-Period Averages of Rupee Earnings measure; Size of Earnings, Profits after Taxes and Dividend 
Payout Percentage’s across Industry Cross-section, 1976-2007 
Period Size of Earnings & Profits after Taxes Equity & Preference Dividend Payout Ratio 
Industry 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 
689.80 1405.96 3927.73 26514.81 -22859.22 119.13 80.93 46.17 58.51 33.73 Foundry 
723.60 1429.48 3972.48 26558.76 -22543.02 11.97 2.59 1.43 0.41 0.66 
-268.20 -1541.50 -2891.82 -1854.50 -2338.17 6.96 2.61 2.00 13.01 3.88 Jute 
-240.60 -1530.42 -2885.19 -1848.43 -2337.89 3.02 0.45 0.04 0.26 0.01 
4564.40 8577.82 8013.43 40540.36 49016.71 38.25 39.29 76.67 31.88 62.86 Other Machinery 
4678.00 8664.65 8073.60 40578.01 49057.47 2.49 1.03 0.95 0.12 0.07 
1935.40 3323.49 8052.23 29237.79 72371.63 54.88 54.54 45.66 26.19 34.05 Medicines 
1948.40 3334.95 8062.03 29239.69 72785.05 0.70 0.38 0.16 0.01 0.58 
3449.00 10485.95 15241.34 42727.18 155038.70 33.21 26.25 41.09 48.74 26.93 Motor 
3502.20 10618.22 15273.57 42745.83 155101.48 1.74 1.42 0.28 0.05 0.05 
1434.60 -398.57 -1421.94 9687.04 843.14 79.11 427.14 85.28 34.61 19.14 Paper 
1505.00 -339.05 -1376.00 9740.29 1036.63 6.71 1181.67 3.37 0.66 1.07 
761.40 1481.08 5108.89 8754.92 16187.37 413.61 206.50 43.51 48.47 29.94 Rubber 
767.00 1487.24 5197.30 8781.15 16375.50 5.09 1.91 1.83 0.29 0.93 
-327.20 -2125.37 -2310.98 7205.53 5896.89 43.14 8.46 28.25 220.61 118.62 Shipping 
32.20 -1800.13 -1182.71 12079.34 11853.19 0.50 0.06 0.03 6.88 12.20 
1487.40 10428.64 2855.33 21190.38 71324.62 37.41 241.76 61.43 31.39 42.36 Silk 
1542.60 10479.88 2894.68 21243.30 72220.13 3.72 9.43 1.62 0.32 1.83 
-346.60 89.77 3220.00 5717.00 3840.72 92.38 44.08 23.29 95.51 77.39 Sugar 
-327.20 117.93 3247.92 5747.87 4045.58 11.39 4.96 1.03 2.42 8.94 
1574.80 3822.87 11492.66 16287.89 18166.07 49.41 92.07 44.89 53.25 49.77 Tea 
1585.20 3830.21 11501.76 16291.97 18177.15 0.71 0.66 0.08 0.02 0.04 
1069.60 2094.92 3947.69 8410.09 23955.18 43.54 39.11 30.41 24.14 25.20 Trading 
1095.20 2112.42 3965.26 8415.86 24247.53 2.40 0.90 0.52 0.09 1.19 
Notes:  The values appearing across each industry are in two rows. The upper row represents the values for Size of Earnings and Equity Dividend payout 
ratio respectively and in the lower row represents Profit after Taxes and Preference Dividend Ratio respectively. Source: Same as in Table 8. 
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Table 10 Annual Percentage Growth Rates of Dividend and Earning Related Measures (Equity & Preference) across Industry  
Cross-section of Companies, 1961 through 2007 
Type Instantaneous Linear Trend Annually Compounded 
Period 1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 
Type Of 
Regression 
Basic Industrial Chemicals 
EQDIV 12.52 8.65 0.14 1028.24 3174.23 2340.57 13.34 9.04 14.99 Parallel 
PRFDIV 1.38 42.23 0.05 3.14 260.55 33.68 1.39 52.55 4.93 Dissimilar 
EQRET 0.91 1.24 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.92 1.25 0.59 Coincident 
PRFRET -0.32 9.07 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.32 9.49 -2.44 Coincident 
SZEAR 10.02 4.56 0.14 2114.07 1976.84 5868.49 10.54 4.67 14.61 Coincident 
PAT 9.91 4.82 0.14 2117.21 2237.39 5902.17 10.41 4.94 14.50 Coincident 
EDPR 2.50 4.09 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 2.53 4.18 0.33 Coincident 
PDPR -8.53 37.41 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 -8.18 45.37 -8.36 Dissimilar 
Cement 
EQDIV 11.03 -16.81 13.02 195.52 -1051.57 449.50 11.67 -15.47 13.90 Dissimilar 
PRFDIV -2.67 -26.71 -1.30 0.56 -7.73 2.58 -2.64 -23.44 -1.29 Coincident 
EQRET -1.68 -19.18 0.15 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -1.66 -17.45 0.15 Dissimilar 
PRFRET -2.04 32.97 3.04 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -2.02 39.06 3.09 Coincident 
SZEAR 0.79 -87.62 8.03 460.50 -7664.10 1067.87 0.79 -58.36 8.36 Parallel 
PAT 0.81 -87.64 7.77 461.05 -7671.83 1070.45 0.81 -58.37 8.08 Parallel 
EDPR -11.41 -10.20 -6.99 0.11 -0.02 -0.09 -10.78 -9.70 -6.75 Coincident 
PDPR -26.04 65.98 -12.18 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -22.93 93.44 -11.46 Dissimilar 
Chemical Fertilizers 
EQDIV 12.30 20.03 0.17 295.62 3217.27 1142.86 13.09 22.18 18.04 Coincident 
PRFDIV 7.48 40.84 0.11 6.37 201.22 32.04 7.77 50.44 11.99 Dissimilar 
EQRET -0.21 4.36 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.21 4.45 0.96 Coincident 
PRFRET -1.09 3.09 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.09 3.14 -3.22 Coincident 
SZEAR 6.08 29.48 0.16 426.62 10861.22 3571.14 6.27 34.29 17.25 Concurrent 
PAT 6.08 29.59 0.16 432.99 11062.45 3571.14 6.26 34.43 17.11 Concurrent 
EDPR 6.22 -9.45 0.01 0.05 -0.05 0.00 6.42 -9.01 0.68 Coincident 
PDPR -2.69 11.25 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.65 11.91 -7.98 Coincident 
Construction 
EQDIV 19.47 13.54 0.18 103.79 292.26 171.38 21.50 14.50 19.41 Coincident 
PRFDIV 5.09 -10.70 0.06 -0.08 2.22 -0.44 5.22 -10.15 6.71 Coincident 
EQRET 2.78 -16.30 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 2.82 -15.04 -1.10 Dissimilar 
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Continued Table 10 Annual Percentage Growth Rates of Nominal Rupee Dividend Paid, Dividend Return on Shares, Rupee Earning 
Measures and Dividend Payout Percentage’s (Equity & Preference) across Industry Cross-section of Companies, 1961 through 2007 
Type Instantaneous Linear Trend Annually Compounded 
Period 1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 
Type Of 
Regression 
PRFRET 21.81 -103.28 0.18 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 24.36 -64.40 19.61 Dissimilar 
SZEAR 11.95 20.05 0.20 171.45 1726.88 727.92 12.69 22.20 22.46 Coincident 
PAT 11.87 20.06 0.20 171.37 1729.10 727.48 12.60 22.22 22.35 Coincident 
EDPR 5.23 -6.51 -0.02 0.08 -0.02 -0.02 5.37 -6.30 -2.44 Coincident 
PDPR 17.84 -149.68 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 19.53 -77.61 18.10 Dissimilar 
Cotton / Blended Textiles 
EQDIV 10.26 4.95 0.07 386.04 330.20 303.44 10.80 5.07 7.47 Coincident 
PRFDIV -3.71 75.35 0.04 -0.50 156.79 20.08 -3.64 112.45 4.11 Dissimilar 
EQRET 4.95 -11.76 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 5.07 -11.09 1.28 Dissimilar 
PRFRET 0.40 12.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 13.62 -0.38 Coincident 
SZEAR 14.95 -45.09 0.09 579.82 -3975.73 366.94 16.12 -36.30 9.06 Coincident 
PAT 14.92 -45.03 0.09 579.31 -3818.94 387.03 16.09 -36.26 9.05 Coincident 
EDPR 4.11 -9.20 -0.02 0.05 -0.31 -0.06 4.20 -8.79 -1.63 Coincident 
PDPR -10.82 62.28 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -10.25 86.42 -5.21 Dissimilar 
Electricity Generation and Supply 
EQDIV 11.65 23.64 0.18 103.42 2369.55 710.20 12.35 26.67 19.48 Dissimilar 
PRFDIV -1.27 68.56 0.08 -0.77 265.88 34.96 -1.26 98.50 8.47 Dissimilar 
EQRET 3.42 -0.97 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.48 -0.97 2.84 Coincident 
PRFRET -1.51 -50.85 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 -1.50 -39.86 4.82 Dissimilar 
SZEAR 17.53 17.64 0.19 705.71 6789.58 2435.98 19.16 19.29 20.51 Coincident 
PAT 17.17 18.05 0.18 113752.06 106696.60 2470.94 18.73 19.78 20.29 Coincident 
EDPR -5.88 6.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -5.71 6.19 -0.86 Concurrent 
PDPR -18.44 -44.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -16.84 -35.94 -0.27 Coincident 
Electric  Machinery 
EQDIV 9.15 13.62 0.12 299.22 2040.71 888.02 9.58 14.59 13.06 Coincident 
PRFDIV -2.75 52.88 0.02 -1.77 127.39 15.17 -2.71 69.70 2.41 Dissimilar 
EQRET -0.67 -0.51 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.67 -0.51 0.91 Coincident 
PRFRET -3.36 -5.45 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.30 -5.30 -5.27 Coincident 
SZEAR 7.33 14.44 0.13 433.84 3532.55 2317.37 7.61 15.54 14.11 Coincident 
PAT 7.16 14.64 0.13 432.07 3659.94 2332.55 7.43 15.76 14.01 Coincident 
EDPR 1.82 -0.82 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 1.84 -0.82 -0.92 Coincident 
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Continued Table 10 Annual Percentage Growth Rates of Nominal Rupee Dividend Paid, Dividend Return on Shares, Rupee Earning 
Measures and Dividend Payout Percentage’s (Equity & Preference) across Industry Cross-section of Companies, 1961 through 2007 
Type Instantaneous Linear Trend Annually Compounded 
Period 1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 
Type Of 
Regression
Ferrous / Non-Ferrous Metal Products 
PDPR -9.92 38.24 -0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 -9.44 46.59 -10.18 Dissimilar 
EQDIV 11.44 5.37 12.22 137.59 206.76 273.28 12.13 5.52 12.99 Coincident 
PRFDIV 0.13 66.61 0.64 0.22 36.45 4.59 0.13 94.66 0.65 Dissimilar 
EQRET 3.51 -9.49 2.11 0.00 -0.01 0.00 3.58 -9.05 2.13 Dissimilar 
PRFRET 0.64 5.37 -6.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.64 5.51 -6.36 Coincident 
SZEAR 20.06 -82.08 7.27 326.54 -2011.34 326.51 22.21 -55.99 7.55 Dissimilar 
PAT 21.28 -82.07 7.85 326.76 -1974.90 331.10 23.71 -55.99 8.16 Dissimilar 
EDPR -8.62 17.41 -2.71 -0.36 0.28 -0.16 -8.26 19.01 -2.68 Coincident 
PDPR -21.14 81.52 -14.54 -0.06 0.03 -0.03 -19.06 125.97 -13.53 Dissimilar 
Foundries and Engineering Workshops 
EQDIV 15.79 -18.74 16.40 211.21 -1453.35 509.18 17.10 -17.09 17.82 Dissimilar 
PRFDIV -0.19 60.68 7.81 0.87 33.10 10.81 -0.19 83.46 8.12 Dissimilar 
EQRET 4.77 -39.10 -0.62 0.00 -0.03 0.00 4.89 -32.36 -0.62 Dissimilar 
PRFRET -0.30 6.31 -3.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.30 6.52 -3.49 Coincident 
SZEAR 21.35 -121.66 6.72 375.76 -18697.77 -579.80 23.80 -70.38 6.95 Dissimilar 
PAT 20.85 -121.66 6.42 376.63 -18664.67 -568.99 23.18 -70.38 6.63 Dissimilar 
EDPR -2.67 -38.63 -6.85 -0.05 -0.08 -0.04 -2.64 -32.04 -6.62 Dissimilar 
PDPR -18.51 40.87 -15.34 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -16.90 50.48 -14.22 Dissimilar 
Jute Textiles 
EQDIV -4.83 -23.07 1.20 -2.02 -30.11 2.82 -4.72 -20.60 1.21 Parallel 
PRFDIV -10.14 -17.40 -1.72 -1.87 -0.89 -1.13 -9.64 -15.97 -1.70 Coincident 
EQRET -5.99 -30.04 -2.95 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -5.81 -25.95 -2.91 Parallel 
PRFRET 7.94 -28.75 27.49 0.00 -0.01 0.00 8.26 -24.99 31.64 Coincident 
SZEAR -7.46 0.00 -4.98 -171.38 -58.22 -79.49 -7.19 0.00 -4.86 Coincident 
PAT -7.49 0.00 -5.00 -173.24 -59.11 -80.62 -7.21 0.00 -4.88 Coincident 
EDPR -10.83 -21.22 -0.58 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -10.26 -19.12 -0.58 Coincident 
PDPR -0.42 -40.70 26.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.42 -33.43 30.87 Coincident 
Machinery other than Transport and Electrical 
EQDIV 11.90 9.71 12.48 465.62 1640.11 930.32 12.64 10.20 13.29 Coincident 
EQRET 2.52 3.33 3.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 2.55 3.39 3.07 Coincident 
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Continued Table 10 Annual Percentage Growth Rates of Nominal Rupee Dividend Paid, Dividend Return on Shares, Rupee Earning Measures 
and Dividend Payout Percentage’s (Equity & Preference) across Industry Cross-section of Companies, 1961 through 2007 
Type Instantaneous Linear Trend Annually Compounded 
Period 1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 
Type Of 
Regression 
PRFRET -0.07 -9.03 -3.73 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 -8.64 -3.66 Coincident 
PRFDIV -6.39 -15.79 -9.98 -4.59 0.91 -3.94 -6.19 -14.60 -9.49 Coincident 
SZEAR 9.18 -5.80 11.68 1046.14 -1815.39 2329.73 9.62 -5.63 12.39 Parallel 
PAT 9.03 -5.80 11.56 1041.55 -1814.48 2325.79 9.45 -5.63 12.26 Parallel 
EDPR 2.72 15.50 0.80 0.02 0.10 0.01 2.76 16.77 0.80 Parallel 
PDPR -15.42 77.27 -11.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 -14.29 116.57 -11.19 Dissimilar 
Medicines and Pharmaceutical Preparations 
EQDIV 11.49 25.07 15.23 255.17 4049.81 1065.83 12.18 28.49 16.45 Dissimilar 
PRFDIV -10.31 60.71 9.69 -0.61 133.72 17.09 -9.79 83.50 10.17 Dissimilar 
EQRET 0.26 12.40 3.79 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.26 13.20 3.86 Dissimilar 
PRFRET 1.02 -95.77 16.27 0.00 0.01 3353.76 1.02 -61.62 17.67 Dissimilar 
SZEAR 15.03 16.69 18.67 836.68 8099.34 3353.76 16.21 18.17 20.52 Coincident 
PAT 14.97 16.88 18.65 836.07 8233.06 3370.85 16.15 18.38 20.51 Coincident 
EDPR -3.53 8.38 -3.43 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 -3.47 8.74 -3.38 Dissimilar 
PDPR -25.27 -127.13 13.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 -22.33 -71.95 14.25 Dissimilar 
Motor Vehicles 
EQDIV 16.75 19.15 17.60 603.84 4464.18 1765.06 18.24 21.11 19.24 Coincident 
PRFDIV -14.57 38.95 -6.05 -5.19 18.50 -1.58 -13.56 47.63 -5.87 Dissimilar 
EQRET 4.75 8.71 4.54 0.01 0.02 0.01 4.86 9.10 4.65 Coincident 
PRFRET -5.83 -3.22 -1.31 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -5.66 -3.17 -1.30 Coincident 
SZEAR 15.03 30.05 17.54 1539.21 16973.70 6490.36 16.22 35.06 19.18 Coincident 
PAT 14.87 30.06 17.44 1534.02 16991.41 6488.44 16.03 35.06 19.06 Coincident 
EDPR 1.72 -10.90 0.06 0.01 -0.07 0.00 1.73 -10.33 0.06 Dissimilar 
PDPR -29.44 23.45 -15.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 -25.50 26.42 -13.96 Coincident 
Paper and Paper Products 
EQDIV 6.56 -15.49 6.44 79.53 -383.41 119.49 6.78 -14.35 6.65 Dissimilar 
PRFDIV -1.87 -31.15 -4.58 -0.81 -1.75 3.43 -1.85 -26.76 -4.47 Coincident 
EQRET 0.38 -29.55 -0.62 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.38 -25.58 -0.61 Dissimilar 
PRFRET 4.10 -66.12 -4.86 0.01 -0.01 0.00 4.19 -48.38 -4.75 Dissimilar 
SZEAR -1.42 -105.57 2.50 103.52 -5113.64 68.53 -1.41 -65.21 2.53 Dissimilar 
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Continued Table 10 Annual Percentage Growth Rates of Nominal Rupee Dividend Paid, Dividend Return on Shares, Rupee Earning Measures 
and Dividend Payout Percentage’s (Equity & Preference) across Industry Cross-section of Companies, 1961 through 2007 
Type Instantaneous Linear Trend Annually Compounded 
Period 1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 
Type Of 
Regression 
PAT -0.39 -0.90 3.46 102.71 -5115.40 71.96 -0.39 -0.89 3.52 Coincident 
EDPR -7.45 -26.12 -9.42 -0.10 -0.05 -0.11 -7.18 -22.99 -8.99 Coincident 
PDPR -17.22 -41.75 -21.92 -0.29 0.00 -0.27 -15.82 -34.13 -19.68 Coincident 
Rubber and Rubber Products 
EQDIV 14.39 2.65 12.07 203.74 127.73 221.26 15.47 2.68 12.83 Dissimilar 
PRFDIV 17.31 45.42 12.97 4.91 64.46 8.46 18.90 57.49 13.85 Parallel 
EQRET 4.71 -7.58 2.31 0.01 -0.01 0.00 4.83 -7.30 2.33 Concurrent 
PRFRET 7.63 27.89 10.72 0.01 0.10 0.01 7.93 32.17 11.32 Coincident 
SZEAR 25.26 15.38 19.79 618.35 2069.06 757.07 28.74 16.62 21.88 Coincident 
PAT 24.92 15.62 19.61 623.26 2133.51 765.52 28.30 16.91 21.66 Coincident 
EDPR -11.14 -12.73 -7.46 -0.28 -0.05 -0.17 -10.55 -11.95 -7.19 Coincident 
PDPR -7.86 18.23 -0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 -7.56 19.99 -0.42 Coincident 
Shipping 
EQDIV 16.13 -11.68 19.44 124.65 -417.20 298.65 17.51 -11.02 21.46 Coincident 
PRFDIV 12.61 12.74 15.01 3.36 19.49 8.40 13.44 13.58 16.20 Coincident 
EQRET 7.36 -19.34 9.04 0.00 -0.02 0.00 7.64 -17.59 9.46 Coincident 
PRFRET 3.62 16.97 -1.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.69 18.50 -1.46 Coincident 
SZEAR 8.24 -3.97 14.61 16.32 -1022.37 412.83 8.59 -3.89 15.73 Coincident 
PAT 12.01 16.68 19.01 140.97 -1439.57 711.48 12.76 18.16 20.94 Coincident 
EDPR 9.53 13.47 14.18 0.14 0.12 0.06 10.00 14.42 15.24 Coincident 
PDPR 2.36 -39.06 -4.57 0.00 0.01 0.01 2.39 -32.34 -4.47 Coincident 
Silk and Rayon Textiles 
EQDIV 14.62 8.93 19.54 221.93 2416.99 1187.18 15.75 9.34 21.59 Coincident 
PRFDIV 0.68 65.39 10.59 0.10 224.80 34.75 0.68 92.31 11.17 Dissimilar 
EQRET -0.67 -8.91 -0.50 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.67 -8.53 -0.50 Coincident 
PRFRET 5.92 -4.68 -4.91 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 6.10 -4.58 -4.79 Coincident 
SZEAR 15.40 -54.56 16.15 515.08 -3288.14 2654.50 16.65 -42.05 17.53 Coincident 
PAT 14.90 -54.23 15.78 515.18 -3063.33 2689.25 16.07 -41.86 17.09 Coincident 
EDPR -0.03 3.87 -2.04 -0.04 0.03 -0.05 -0.03 3.95 -2.02 Coincident 
PDPR -13.48 60.21 -10.60 0.00 0.01 0.00 -12.61 82.60 -10.06 Dissimilar 
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Continued Table 10 Annual Percentage Growth Rates of Nominal Rupee Dividend Paid, Dividend Return on Shares, Rupee Earning Measures 
and Dividend Payout Percentage’s (Equity & Preference) across Industry Cross-section of Companies, 1961 through 2007 
Type Instantaneous Linear Trend Annually Compounded 
Period 1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 1961-92 1993-07 1961-07 
Type Of 
Regression 
 
EQDIV 11.55 1.02 11.79 57.65 42.74 97.31 12.25 1.03 12.52 Coincident 
PRFDIV 1.68 7.51 5.95 0.43 18.62 6.76 1.70 7.80 6.13 Coincident 
EQRET 9.25 -14.30 4.57 0.01 -0.02 0.00 9.69 -13.33 4.68 Dissimilar 
PRFRET 5.48 31.41 6.75 0.00 -0.02 0.00 5.64 36.90 6.98 Coincident 
SZEAR 25.26 21.53 17.07 203.23 -674.46 293.94 28.73 24.03 18.62 Coincident 
PAT 25.36 21.95 17.09 203.67 -655.84 300.71 28.86 24.54 18.64 Coincident 
EDPR -0.27 5.82 0.49 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.27 5.99 0.49 Coincident 
PDPR -10.98 75.28 1.44 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -10.40 112.30 1.45 Dissimilar 
Tea 
EQDIV 19.57 -1.25 13.08 544.22 33.54 406.92 21.62 -1.25 13.97 Dissimilar 
PRFDIV -1.72 32.23 0.77 -0.05 2.97 0.00 -1.70 38.03 0.78 Dissimilar 
EQRET 8.50 -1.06 5.52 0.02 0.00 0.01 8.88 -1.05 5.68 Concurrent 
PRFRET 2.37 49.00 21.72 0.00 -0.01 0.00 2.39 63.23 24.26 Coincident 
SZEAR 21.47 5.28 13.86 1275.38 1335.57 908.06 23.95 5.42 14.87 Coincident 
PAT 21.41 5.29 13.82 1275.32 1338.54 908.06 23.87 5.43 14.82 Coincident 
EDPR -1.90 -6.54 -0.78 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -1.88 -6.33 -0.78 Coincident 
PDPR -23.12 69.86 12.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 -20.64 101.09 13.27 Coincident 
Trading 
EQDIV 9.89 17.80 11.70 86.03 579.41 218.23 10.40 19.48 12.41 Coincident 
PRFDIV -6.60 98.30 2.49 -0.92 87.24 11.14 -6.39 167.25 2.52 Dissimilar 
EQRET 1.70 -16.10 -0.76 0.00 -0.01 0.00 1.71 -14.87 -0.76 Concurrent 
PRFRET -3.57 7.23 -3.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.51 7.49 -3.62 Parallel 
SZEAR 13.35 19.60 15.20 348.74 3400.55 1049.69 14.28 21.65 16.42 Coincident 
PAT 13.17 19.90 15.20 347.81 3487.79 1060.83 14.08 22.02 16.42 Concurrent 
EDPR -3.50 -1.84 -3.58 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -3.44 -1.83 -3.52 Coincident 
PDPR -19.80 78.40 -12.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 -17.96 119.02 -11.93 Dissimilar 
Source: Same as in Table 8. 
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Table 11 Changing Relative Ranks (1=Highest to 20=Lowest) based on Absolute (A) & CAGR (G) of Annual Nominal Rupee Dividends Paid 
and Dividend Return on Shares (Equity & Preference) in Year Ending, 1976 through 2007 
Equity Dividend Preference Dividend Equity Return Preference Return Industry A1 A2 A3 G1 G2 G3 A1 A2 A3 G1 G2 G3 A1 A2 A3 G1 G2 G3 A1 A2 A3 G1 G2 G3 
Basic Chemical 1 1 1 8 10 9 1 1 1 6 10 10 6 10 9 13 5 13 3 9 4 14 7 12 
Cement 12 10 12 15 18 11 11 14 13 13 19 16 14 12 12 19 16 14 9 5 7 17 2 8 
Fertilizers 9 4 5 9 3 6 2 2 2 3 11 3 7 9 8 16 3 11 2 7 3 15 11 13 
Construction 19 18 18 2 7 4 16 19 18 4 16 8 11 19 13 10 15 19 11 20 17 1 20 3 
Cotton 2 12 8 16 12 18 3 5 5 15 2 11 9 11 10 4 12 10 17 17 16 11 6 9 
Electricity 14 8 9 11 2 13 7 3 3 10 3 6 5 5 5 9 7 7 8 11 12 16 17 7 
Electric Mach. 5 7 6 18 6 3 6 7 6 14 8 13 12 14 11 17 6 12 6 15 11 18 14 19 
Metal 11 14 13 14 11 14 10 15 15 8 4 15 16 16 17 8 11 9 10 18 14 10 10 20 
Foundry 15 9 11 5 19 7 12 8 8 9 7 7 17 17 19 5 20 17 15 12 15 13 9 14 
Jute 20 20 20 20 20 20 17 20 19 18 18 17 20 20 20 20 19 20 19 16 20 2 16 1 
Other Machinery 3 5 3 10 8 12 4 17 14 16 17 20 8 4 6 11 4 6 7 10 10 12 15 16 
Medicines 7 6 7 13 1 8 18 6 7 19 6 5 4 2 3 15 1 5 13 4 9 9 19 4 
Motor 4 2 2 3 4 5 5 16 16 20 12 19 3 3 4 6 2 4 5 14 8 20 12 10 
Paper 13 17 17 19 17 19 8 13 9 12 20 18 18 15 18 14 18 16 16 2 5 6 18 17 
Rubber 10 15 15 7 13 15 13 12 11 1 9 2 10 6 7 7 9 8 4 1 2 3 4 5 
Shipping 17 13 14 4 16 2 20 11 17 2 14 1 19 8 16 3 17 1 20 6 19 7 5 11 
Silk 8 3 4 6 9 1 9 4 4 7 5 4 1 7 1 18 10 15 1 8 1 4 13 18 
Sugar 18 19 19 12 14 16 14 10 10 5 15 9 15 13 15 1 13 3 12 3 6 5 3 6 
Tea 6 11 10 1 15 10 19 18 20 11 13 14 2 1 2 2 8 2 14 13 13 8 1 2 
Trading 16 16 16 17 5 17 15 9 12 17 1 12 13 18 14 12 14 18 18 19 18 19 8 15 
Notes: The letters A and G represents Absolute and Annually Compounded Growth rates respectively, the suffix 1, 2, and 3 attached to such letters indicate the Pre-
reform, Post-reform and the Full-period respectively. Source:  Same as in Table 8. 
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Table 12 Changing Ranks (1=Highest to 20=Lowest) based on Absolute & CAGR of Annual Nominal Rupee Earnings and Dividend Payout 
Percentages (Equity & Preference) in Year Ending, 1976 through 2007 
Size of Earnings Profit after Taxes Equity Dividend Payout Preference Dividend Payout 
Industry 
A1 A2 A3 G1 G2 G3 A1 A2 A3 G1 G2 G3 A1 A2 A3 G1 G2 G3 A1 A2 A3 G1 G2 G3 
Basic Chemical 1 1 1 13 11 12 1 1 1 14 12 12 15 9 15 6 7 5 12 10 13 6 11 11 
Cement 17 9 10 18 18 16 17 9 10 18 19 16 1 16 2 20 15 18 3 15 3 19 6 15 
Fertilizers 9 3 3 17 2 8 9 3 3 17 2 8 10 10 12 2 14 3 8 6 9 4 14 10 
Construction 16 14 14 12 4 1 16 15 14 13 4 1 6 14 8 3 11 13 9 20 12 1 20 2 
Cotton 12 13 13 10 15 15 11 14 13 8 16 15 2 2 1 4 13 11 4 4 4 8 7 9 
Electricity 8 8 8 6 6 4 8 8 8 6 6 4 18 18 19 15 5 10 11 8 10 13 18 6 
Electric Mach. 5 7 7 16 9 13 5 7 7 16 10 13 11 8 13 7 9 9 13 9 14 7 10 13 
Metal 14 15 15 5 17 17 14 16 16 4 18 17 4 3 3 17 1 14 2 3 2 16 1 17 
Foundry 13 19 18 4 20 18 13 19 19 5 20 18 8 7 9 12 20 17 6 13 7 14 9 19 
Jute 19 20 20 20 12 20 20 20 20 20 13 20 20 20 20 18 18 7 16 16 17 3 16 1 
Other Machinery 3 6 5 14 14 14 3 6 5 15 15 14 14 6 14 5 2 2 14 17 16 11 3 14 
Medicines 7 4 4 9 7 3 7 4 4 7 7 3 13 15 16 14 4 15 19 14 19 18 19 3 
Motor 2 2 2 8 1 5 2 2 2 10 1 5 17 12 17 8 16 6 17 18 18 20 12 18 
Paper 18 17 17 19 19 19 18 17 18 19 14 19 5 17 5 16 19 20 1 7 1 12 17 20 
Rubber 10 12 12 1 8 2 10 12 12 2 9 2 3 11 4 19 17 19 10 12 11 5 13 7 
Shipping 20 16 19 15 13 9 19 13 15 12 8 9 19 1 6 1 3 1 20 1 6 2 15 8 
Silk 6 5 6 7 16 7 6 5 6 9 17 7 7 13 7 9 8 12 7 5 8 10 8 12 
Sugar 15 18 16 2 3 6 15 18 17 1 3 6 12 4 10 10 6 4 5 2 5 9 4 5 
Tea 4 10 9 3 10 10 4 10 9 3 11 10 9 5 11 11 12 8 18 19 20 17 5 4 
Trading 11 11 11 11 5 11 12 11 11 11 5 11 16 19 18 13 10 16 15 11 15 15 2 16 
Notes and Source: Same as in Table 11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13 Results of K-W Test to Detect Differences in Dividend Related Measures due to the 
Impact of Economic Reforms across Industry Cross-section 
K-W Stats. EQDIV PRFDIV EQRET PRFRET SZEAR PAT EDPOR PDPOR 
Pre-Reform periods 
Chi-Square 195.23 213.54 147.73 82.61 152.37 148.76 101.31 91.99 
Asymp. Sig. 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Post-Reform periods 
Chi-Square 120.83 62.91 92.64 30.85 94.55 92.75 60.97 40.07 
Asymp. Sig. 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.04** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Notes: a. K-W Stats. denote Kruslal-Wallis test statistics b. Asymp. Sig. is Asymptotic Significance Source: 
Same as in Table 8. 
 
 
 
